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power in Gauteng, South Africa1 
Abstract 
The world of work has been reorganised, the numbers of workers employed through the 
standard employment relationship has declined and there has been an increase in non-standard 
employment: labour broking, outsourcing and other forms of precarious and temporary work. 
This has created highly unequal workplaces where atypical workers perform the same work as 
permanent workers for often half the wages of what a permanent worker receives. This article 
considers how precarious workers are organising, outside of trade unions, to fight against 
workplace inequality to gain rights to permanent work. This article develops the power 
resource approach (PRA) as a lens through which to explore how labour broker workers are 
organising in Gauteng. Through the analysis of two workplace case studies, the article 
examines how amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 2015 provided new rights 
and a new avenue through which precarious workers could organise. The case studies illustrate 
the dynamic interactions between institutional and associational power, an often overlooked 
relationship , and demonstrate the multiple avenues through which precarious workers mobilise 
their power to fight against inequality.  
Introduction 
The use of outsourced, casualised and atypical labour in South Africa has overlaid and 
perpetuated the apartheid system of cheap black labour. Today, it is estimated that four out of 
ten workers in the formal sector are precarious workers (Webster and Francis 2018). Such 
workers are especially vulnerable to exploitation and earn, on average, half of what a 
permanent worker earns (Casim and Cassale 2018). 
The use of workers employed through temporary employment services (TES), more commonly 
known as labour broking in South Africa, has been increasing since 1995 (Theron 2005). This 
has been aided by the fact, as Theron (ibid.) highlights, that the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) entrenched a loophole regarding the employment relations of labour broker workers. 
Until 2015, Section 198 of the LRA stated that workers were ‘deemed’ to be employees of their 
employer (the TES) and not the client (the company that hires the labour broker to provide 
workers) (ibid.). The impact of this has meant that labour brokers workers have had little 
protection against unfair dismissal, as challenging a dismissal by the client company, when 




Similarly, labour broker workers were also, effectively, denied their constitutional right to 
strike, one of the most powerful tools that workers have at their disposal to improve their 
earnings and fight inequality. The Constitution extends the right to strike to every worker but 
the LRA limits this right to employees. So labour broker workers may only strike against their 
‘employer’, the TES. Even if labour broker workers did strike, there is little reasonable prospect 
of exercising the rights to bargain as their wages and conditions are determined by the contract 
between the client and the TES. Therefore, any hope of success would depend upon the remote 
possibility of the TES renegotiating its contract with the client (Theron 2005). The increased 
use of labour broking has been a central part of workplace restructuring and the restructuring 
of the working class post-apartheid, entrenching both poverty and inequality. 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has since 2006 called for a ban on 
labour broking. The government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), responded to 
this by amending Section 198 and new rights for labour broker workers came into force in 
2015. The amendment restricted labour broking to work of a genuinely temporary nature and 
required that labour broker workers become permanent workers of the client company after 
three months. While this was not a ban on labour broking, it was a significant step forward in 
the right to decent work. Since the amendment came into force, thousands of labour broker 
workers, generally outside of trade unions, have attempted to take up these new rights (Rees 
2019). 
Through a case study analysis of two workplaces, Luxor Paints and the Midrand Dis-Chem 
distribution centre, this article examines how precarious workers2 South Africa have built 
power to challenge the deeply unequal post-apartheid workplace. We develop our analysis 
through a critical engagement with the power resources approach (PRA), to consider how the 
dynamic interaction of different forms of power contest workplace inequality. This analysis is 
set against a consideration of how the growth in ‘non-core’ work has restructured the labour 
market and how trade unions have largely failed to adapt to the changing world of work.  
Methodology 
The case studies presented here are from different industries and are of differing workplace 
sizes.. Luxor Paints is a family-owned paint manufacturer located in the Jet Park industrial 
estate on the East Rand of Gauteng, employing an estimated 200 workers, the majority of which 
were employed by a labour broker. Dis-Chem is a high street pharmacy chain that was founded 
in 1978, which has now grown to include, as of November 2019, 149 stores across South Africa 
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and Namibia (Dis-Chem 2019). It is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and was valued 
at R20 billion at the time of the listing (Business Report 2016). The Midrand distribution centre 
employs over 1,000 workers. It is also where the Head Offices of Dis-Chem are located and in 
the analysis that follows, there are overlaps between the management of the distribution centre 
and the overall management of Dis-Chem. 
The seeming differences between the cases presented here may lead some to question the 
comparative validity of the case studies. The strength of presenting case studies that may, at 
first, appear quite different from one another is that contextualised comparisons can help to 
make patterns emerge across diverse experiences and manifestations (Locke and Thelen 1995). 
Comparing diverse contexts thus highlights the commonalities in experiences across industries 
and across workplaces of different sizes as well as to draw out insights that are specific to their 
contexts. This guards against drawing conclusions that are narrowly confined to particular 
sectors and enables us to draw better analytical insights into how workers are organising to 
contest workplace inequality.  
The case studies arise out of the ongoing work that both authors have engaged in with the 
Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO) and the Simunye Workers Forum (SWF). The CWAO 
is a non-profit organisation established in 2011, in Germiston, Gauteng, specifically to assist 
precarious workers to organise (see Runciman and Webster 2017; Webster and Englert 2019). 
Since the 2015 LRA amendments came into force, they have assisted over 12,000 labour broker 
workers to become permanent workers (CWAO 2019). The SWF was established in 2015 by 
labour broker workers from across industrial sectors as a forum in which they could organise 
together around their common issues.  
The article primarily draws upon group interviews with worker leaders. Drawing on the 
testimonies of worker leaders has both strengths and weaknesses. Workers leaders are often 
the most knowledgeable about ongoing struggles and provide particular insights into these 
struggles. However, by focussing on worker leaders we are aware that the narratives presented 
here may, and are probably not, shared by all workers. The interviews are also supplemented 
by the ongoing research, knowledge and experience of the authors who have been actively 
involved in supporting the struggle of workers within SWF. The research that is presented here 
is therefore a product of deep and ongoing engagement with ‘comrades’ and is supplemented 
by relationships that extend far beyond a conventional research project. 
The restructuring of the South African labour force 
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Von Holdt and Webster (2005) analyse the South African labour force as made up of three 
concentric circles with a core of permanent employees in the formal economy, surrounded by 
a group of non-core workers, those in precarious working conditions within the formal sector, 
and finally the periphery composed of the informal and the unemployed. They show how these 
groups are ‘asymmetrically interdependent’ (Von Holdt and Webster 2005: 27), thus 
challenging the idea of a dual economy constituted by a modern and an informal sector. The 
three concentric circles constitute a continuum between those that ‘earn a living’ in the formal 
economy and those that have to invent their own means of subsistence – ‘making a living’ – in 
the informal economy (Webster 2005). The non-core is made up of those workers who, despite 
working in the formal sector, experience uncertain and perpetually changing working 
conditions. Although the conceptualisation of the core, non-core and periphery developed by 
Von Holdt and Webster undoubtedly adds valuable insights to the observed reality of the South 
African labour market, it, perhaps, creates a false distinction between the role of the core and 
non-core in the formal workplace. Indeed, just as Webster found in 1985, that black African 
migrant foundry workers played a fundamental role in the production process, precarious 
workers are at the core of the production process today (see Webster and Englert 2019). While 
we may want to be cautious about the distinctions drawn between the categories of core and 
non-core workers, measuring their presence provides invaluable insight into the changing 
structure of South Africa’s labour force.  
Table 1: Core, non-core and periphery, 2004-2017 (millions) 
 2004 2017 Change 
 Millions % of 
EAP 
Millions % of 
EAP 
Millions %  
Core 6.6 33 8.4 34 +1.8 +27 




      
2.2 11 2.8 11 +0.6 +27 








Source: Von Holdt and Webster (2005); Webster and Francis (2018) and Englert (2018). 
Table 1 provides an analysis of the number and percentage of workers employed in core, non-
core and periphery in the South African workforce, although it must be stated that due to the 
difficulties in measuring precarious work, all such data must be treated with caution. As Table 
1 shows, the total of the economically active population (EAP) grew from 20.3 million people 
to 24.6 million people, an increase of 21%. While the percentage increases across the core, 
non-core and the periphery can be explained, in large part, by the increase in the EAP it is also 
important to note that the largest growth occurred amongst the non-core, which increased by 
71% in just over ten years, over two times faster than the formal and informal sectors. As a 
consequence, four out of ten workers in the formal sector (core and non-core) can be estimated 
to be precarious. This underlines the growing importance of this group of workers in the labour 
process and the economy as a whole. Overall, the large scope and increase in precarious 
employment makes it increasingly difficult to consider such employment relations as ‘atypical’ 
(Englert 2018). Given that such workers are most likely to be denied basic labour rights and 
earn considerably less than workers employed within the core, as argued above, the growing 
use of precarious labour has entrenched poverty and inequality post-apartheid.  
Labour power in precarious times 
While the amendment to Section 198 of the LRA was intended to address some of the 
inequalities outlined above, ultimately, the primary way in which workers have been able to 
fight poverty and inequality has been through collective action. Under conditions of capitalism, 
trade unions have historically been a key vehicle through which worker rights are fought for 
and working conditions improved. But the ability of trade unions to organise to defend workers 
and contest working conditions under current conditions, where work has been substantially 
reorganised, has been considerably weakened. The percentage of the workforce (excluding the 
agricultural sector) that is unionised has declined from a high of 57.5% in 1996 (Macun 2014: 
43) to 35.1% in 2019 based on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (StatsSA 2019). 
Furthermore, the demographic of who is organised has altered considerably. The latest 
COSATU survey demonstrates that 90% of its membership are permanent workers, with two 
thirds of those members engaged in skilled or supervisory work (Bischoff and Tame, 2017: 
66). The traditional blue collar worker that was historically the base of COSATU has declined 




The challenges faced by the South African trade union are not unique and trade unions across 
the world confront similar issues. This has led to the development of a body of literature 
focussed on trade union renewal through the analysis of the power resources approach (PRA). 
As Schmalz and his colleagues note, ‘the PRA is founded on the basic premise that organised 
labour can successfully defend its interests by collective mobilisation of power resources’ 
(2018: 113). The PRA analyses four forms of power. Structural power, derived from workers 
position in the economic system and their ability to control, disrupt or halt production. 
Associational power, the power that emerges from collectives that are able to mobilise power 
in various forms. Societal power, the power that can be derived from alliances with other actors 
such as social movements, students and NGOs to support labour demands. Lastly, institutional 
power pertains to the institutional framework for labour relations, which is itself a product of 
labour struggles derived from both structural and associational power. A wide body of literature 
analysing PRA in relation to precarious workers has developed in recent times (for an overview 
see Schmalz, Ludwig and Webster 2018). However, we argue that this literature is built upon 
a number of key assumptions that are problematic for our analysis of power.  
Analysts and activists of the labour movement often start with the premise that precarious 
workers are ‘too vulnerable’ and therefore ‘difficult to organise’ (see Horn 2014; Vulnerable 
Workers Task Team 2014). However, this view is often premised entirely on the difficulty of 
organising precarious workers into traditional trade unions due to the unstable conditions of 
their employment based on the underlying assumption that labour broker workers move in and 
out of the workplace relatively quickly. But, as our ongoing research has demonstrated, labour 
broker workers are for the most part employed for relatively long periods of time. A 2018 
survey of 128 workers within the SWF demonstrated that most had worked between one and 
four years in the same company. While this is a small and not necessarily representative survey, 
these findings are also confirmed by the experiences of the authors in working with the CWAO. 
In our experience, labour broker workers are not flexible extras but increasingly occupy core 
functions in the production process, as argued above.  
A further limitation of the PRA literature, we argue, is that it has tended to understand the 
strengthening of associational power only through the lens of trade unions (see also Sullivan 
2010), neglecting an analysis of flexible, informal and/or independent forms of associational 
power. When the struggles of precarious workers are analysed using PRA, it has tended 
towards focussing the analysis upon societal power as a key resource to build precarious 
workers’ power (Webster and Ludwig 2017; Wilderman 2017). This is based on a further 
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assumption that the restructuring of work, through the use of atypical labour, has limited the 
availability of other sources of power, particularly structural power. Although it is undeniable 
that deskilled workers in a high unemployment context have less structural power than skilled 
workers, what is often missing from analysis is an appreciation of the fact that such workers 
increasingly occupy a central place in the production process and, as such, have the ability to 
significantly disrupt production — especially in a context where labour broker workers have 
either entirely replaced permanent workers or do the same or similar jobs to permanent 
workers, as our case studies will illustrate. The distinctions that Von Holdt and Webster (2005) 
made between core and non-core workers no longer strictly hold and this requires analysts to 
rethink structural power in relation to precarious workers (see also Englert 2018).  
While previous analysis of PRA in relation to precarious workers struggles may have its 
limitations, we believe that the analytical framework is still a useful tool for unpacking the 
dynamics of worker struggle for analysts and activists alike. However, we stress, that the 
conceptual framework has the most utility when the focus of analysis is between the dynamic 
interactions between different sources of power. As Schmalz and his colleagues highlight, ‘it 
is not so much the extent of power resources, but rather their development and specific 
combinations which are crucial’ (2018: 115). In the following case studies, we trace the 
dynamic interactions of power as workers confronted their employers in the struggle for 
permanent work. We begin by introducing the workplace case studies, justifying their selection 
and providing some contextual history, before going on to analyse how the intersections of 
differing forms of power shaped the struggle within each case.  
Working as a labour broker in Luxor Paints and Dis-Chem 
Labour broking has instituted a new workplace apartheid, which has manifested itself in both 
the formal and informal segregation of workplaces (see Englert 2018). Labour broker workers 
often use separate entrances to permanent workers, use change rooms of inferior quality and 
are denied access to workplace facilities such as break rooms and clinics (see also Theron 
2016). Formal segregation is often reinforced by informal segregation amongst workers, as 
Pule, a worker at Dis-Chem explains, 
the old permanent guys in the canteen they had their own tables. Even if they 
are not there you can’t sit there. They had this tendency to treat us like we are 
in a foreign land (group interview, 10 August 2018). 
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In a context of often strong antagonisms between permanent and labour broker workers, 
workers often struggle to find common ground. However, at Luxor Paints, permanent workers 
and labour broker workers did find, briefly, a cause to unite around.  
At Luxor Paints, permanent workers were unionised by the Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, 
Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPWAU), while the labour broker workers were not 
unionised. The labour broker workers say that the union never approached them to organise 
them and that management banned meetings with the permanents. As Khongelani says, ‘our 
constitutional rights to form or to join a trade union were violated… To survive was individual 
choice to accept victimisation, oppression and violation of your rights as a worker’ (group 
interview, 26 July 2018). 
Despite this, in 2012, the permanent workers under CEPPWAWU embarked on a strike for 
better wages and managed to convince the non-unionised labour broker workers to join them 
in exchange for including the demand that they be made permanent workers. Although labour 
broker workers were not convinced that the permanent workers would keep to their word, the 
labour broker workers joined the permanents on strike. Unfortunately, these fears were well 
founded when management made an offer to the permanent workers to end the strike. 
Management gave the permanent workers a choice between a pay increase of R200 and 20 
labour broker workers a year being made permanent or a higher increase with no labour broker 
workers being made permanent. They chose the latter in a closed meeting from which the 
labour broker workers were excluded. After the meeting, the permanents told the labour broker 
workers ‘at least you still have a job’ (Khongelani, group interview, 26 July 2018). What the 
experience at Luxor Paints highlights is the contingent way in which the concerns of labour 
broker workers are used to ultimately advance the demands of permanent workers.  
In comparison, at Dis-Chem most workers were no longer unionised following a three month 
strike in 2010, led by the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 
(SACCAWU), that had a crushing impact on workers. The strike became disruptive, at times, 
leading to the arrest of workers (News24 2010). The strike ended without any of the union’s 
demands being met, leaving the workers demoralised and fearful of organising. It also resulted 
in workers leaving the union without joining any other. Although most of the labour broker 
workers were employed after the strike, this legacy impacted upon them too, creating an 
atmosphere in which workers were scared to organise.  
Realising power: the interaction of associational and institutional power  
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When the amendment to Section 198 came into effect in 2015, the differing histories of 
workplace struggles and the dynamic interactions of power encountered by workers shaped 
their responses. At Luxor Paints, the labour broker workers joined the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), the union now organising the permanents, in 2015, 
after the organiser approached them about their new rights. However, they were never fully 
integrated into the union as all the shop stewards were permanent workers and the labour broker 
workers did not have a representative. Despite this, the NUMSA organiser negotiated with 
management and came back with an offer, which would make them permanent workers but not 
equalise their wages with that of existing permanent workers. The organiser encouraged the 
workers to accept the offer, arguing that once they were permanent, he would be able to 
negotiate for better wages. 
At the same time, some workers had seen the CWAO ‘Big New Rights’ pamphlet and a 
delegation of workers attended a general meeting at the CWAO, prior to the formation of the 
SWF. The delegation came back with a positive report that there were many workers from 
different companies at the meeting, and they were advised by a CWAO organiser that they 
should be made permanent and equalised. Armed with this knowledge, the workers were 
reluctant to accept the deal negotiated by the NUMSA organiser and pursued the matter with 
the regional office bearers. However, the office bearers agreed with the organiser that they 
should accept the offer from management. When workers raised the possibility of opening a 
case at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the organiser 
said that it was not possible as ‘the case doesn’t have a name’. The organiser and the regional 
office bearers seemed unaware that the workers could, indeed, open a case at the CCMA to 
access their rights. Disappointed, the labour broker workers left NUMSA and began to organise 
themselves. With support from CWAO, they opened a case at the CCMA.  
The amendments to Section 198 provided workers with new rights that provided the impetus 
for workers to begin to organise. As one worker reflected, in a context of highly unequal and 
divided workplaces, the institutional power provided by the amendments was not enough on 
its own. 
When this thing of Section 198 came into be it give a little bit power to the 
workers, but for those who wanted to force it to work, because the laws can be 
there but if you don't force it to work you can be exploited (Joshua, group 
interview, 26 July 2018).  
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Recognising the need to build associational power that they had not found in unions, the labour 
broker workers formed a workplace forum. The forum had an elected chairperson, a secretary 
and treasurer, and they adopted a simple constitution that had been suggested by CWAO. 
Workers met twice a week, Tuesdays and Thursdays, during their lunch break, in front of the 
company.  
In contrast to Luxor Paints, both permanent and labour broker workers were largely 
unorganised at Dis-Chem. In their case, the fight around Section 198 rights began ‘in secret’, 
(group interview, 10 August 2018), when a group of 17 night shift workers approached CWAO 
to open a case at the CCMA. Employer responses to workers’ demands that their rights be 
enforced was, inevitably, crucial in shaping the associational power of workers.  
Employer responses 
Employer responses to the implementation of Section 198 differ and play a crucial role in 
shaping the emergence of associational power. Management at Luxor Paints deployed multiple 
tactics to delay and frustrate workers. After the case was referred to the CCMA, the company 
registered at the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry (hereafter referred to 
as the bargaining council) and successfully argued that the CCMA, therefore, had no 
jurisdiction over the case, forcing the workers to file a new dispute at the bargaining council. 
These delaying tactics were used by Luxor management to taunt and demoralise workers. 
Management also began to target individual workers, mainly those it knew were financially 
vulnerable, to get them to sign the deal NUMSA had negotiated. This tactic was used 
throughout the process and 21 workers eventually succumbed and became known as the ‘600s’, 
a reference to the pay increase they had accepted.  
Despite the intimidation and delaying tactics used by management, at the first conciliation at 
the bargaining council, the employer indicated that they were willing to take the workers 
permanently and negotiations began. Workers say that the employer now seemed keen to 
negotiate as it had realised that the ‘legal way’ would be costlier for them, having to pay for 
lawyers, compared to the workers that received free legal assistance from CWAO.  
The workers elected an ad hoc negotiating team who would also liaise with CWAO during the 
negotiation. The initial offer from the company was still only an offer to ‘top up’ the salary, a 
top up that would not even meeting the bargaining council minimum wage, technically a labour 
law violation, and was far from equalising pay with the permanent workers. The company kept 
up the pressure on the workers to accept the deal. Aside from targeting individual workers, they 
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offered one of the negotiators a supervisory position, an offer that was eventually accepted with 
the agreement of the other workers, but this was, of course, not without its tensions. 
Furthermore, during the negotiations, the company called in a ‘CCMA commissioner’ to 
explain their rights to them.  
They said he was from CCMA [that he] was coming to clarify the issue of 
Section 198, [but] he was just a bogus guy, they just found him in the street just 
to come to lie to us… Immediately…this guy, we can see 'hai, this one.' We say 
'comrade! let us go back to work. These people are wasting our time’ (Desmond, 
group interview, 27 July 2017). 
When the workers understood that it was a ‘fake commissioner’, they walked out of the room. 
This episode was an important moment for the workers, gaining knowledge on their rights had 
translated into a new-found confidence and power at work.  
That's where we started to call our self the permanents of Luxor Paint [sic], 
without even getting the contract because that's when we started to say 
'comrades, we no longer need Transman [the TES] in this company because the 
law says we are permanent now.' So every time those people of Transman come 
we used to chase them away (Desmod, group interview, 27 July 2017).  
The workers now refused to engage with the labour broker, who was offering improved pay 
and conditions, they only wanted to talk to their employer, Luxor Paints.  
The workers went for arbitration in May 2016 but before the arbitration award was made, the 
company agreed to make the workers permanent and to equalise their pay and conditions with 
the permanents. In addition, the workers would also receive back pay for what the company 
should have paid them since 2015; the equalisation and back pay was staggered over three 
months. Despite entering into an agreement, the employer tried one last time to frustrate the 
workers by trying to apply different salaries to the workers. Empowered by their experiences, 
the workers did not hesitate to go immediately back to the bargaining council to ensure the 
employer honoured the settlement agreement it had entered into with the workers. By February 
2017, all 65 remaining workers were permanent workers of Luxor under equal conditions and 
with back pay. 
At Dis-Chem, the case of the 17 workers went for conciliation at the CCMA and at the 
conciliation Dis-Chem agreed to take the workers permanently in a phased approach, with 
workers with the longest years of service being made permanent first. However, the company 
also only agreed to make workers permanent who had opened a case at the CCMA. Despite the 
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fact that workers had won the right to permanent work, many were still fearful to bring a case, 
as Matla explains: 
some were scared to open the dispute. They thought they would be fired if they 
opened a dispute against the company... They were scared to challenge the 
company until they saw some getting permanent jobs. That’s when they said 
‘eish let’s try’… Most of employees at Dis-Chem, it’s their first job so they 
don't want to lose it (group interview, 10 August 2018) 
Inexperience of organising and fear resulted in over 20 different cases being referred to the 
CCMA. This fear was exacerbated when management started taking workers for polygraph 
tests and dismissed two workers, who were subsequently reinstated with the assistance of 
CWAO. However, rather than cowing, the workers the experience of fighting against the 
polygraph test gave them new courage, ‘by conquering polygraphy it meant that one day we 
would be permanent’ (Tebogo, group interview, 10 August 2018).  
Building and maintaining power after Section 198 
After becoming permanent, the workers faced different challenges in building and maintaining 
associational power and in uniting with the ‘old’ permanent workers. In Luxor Paints, the new 
permanents tried to build unity with the other workers, the old permanents and ‘600s’, but the 
entrenched divisions were not necessarily easy to overcome. The forum organised several 
discussions between its representatives and the old permanent workers. The old permanent 
workers proposed to change union, leaving NUMSA, and have all workers join a new union, 
the General Industrial Workers Union of South Africa (GIWUSA). The forum members, 
however, felt stronger than ever and did not want to join any union. The 65 workers that won 
the Section 198 case thus stayed in the forum and kept meeting. They were joined by some of 
the ‘600s’ and a few of the old permanents. However, most of the old permanents and the 
‘600s’ joined GIWUSA.  
Despite the fact that most of the workers joined GIWUSA, the forum continued and was used 
to resolve immediate workplace issues. Problems were discussed during the two weekly 
meetings and representatives sent to management. Their most notable achievement was to get 
the company to correct – after going to the bargaining council – the vacation days workers 
were entitled to during the December holiday period, when the workplace was closed. The 
forum was an effective way to address workplace issues, one that even management came to 
respect, according to the worker leaders.  
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While Dis-Chem management had agreed to make workers permanent, it reneged on the 
conditions. The settlement agreement had stated that workers would continue to work the same 
hours as they had previously done and that their pay and conditions would be equalised with 
that of existing permanent staff. However, this did not happen. Shifts were changed, hours 
increased but with no increase in pay, and pay was not equalised. In addition to this, 
management continually brought workers into disciplinary proceedings after its failed 
intimidation attempts with the polygraph tests. The reaction of management after workers had 
been made permanent provided the impetus to organise, in this case.  
Initially, workers attempted to organise in a workplace forum, similar to Luxor Paints workers. 
However, the history and conditions of the workplace made this more challenging. As most of 
the workers had become permanent simply through adding their name to a list, worker leaders 
found it difficult to convince workers about the need for a workplace forum. Furthermore, 
workers have restricted access to the workplace and cannot freely move around, as access 
passes restrict workers to certain areas, a challenge not encountered in the smaller Luxor Paints.  
Workers decided that a union would be able to overcome these difficulties as well as being able 
to bargain, as Tebogo explains, ‘the purpose of the union was… to organise us and then to give 
us shape because we were scattered... they would never believe in us, that we can organise 
them. But through the union, when they see that powerful union, they get hope’ (group 
interview, 10 August 2018). Within a period of less than a year, workers joined and left two 
unions, eventually joining a third union, the National Union of Public Service and Allied 
Workers (NUPSAW). However, workers have not relied on the union alone and employ a 
dynamic mix of organising strategies. Workers describe their associational power as involving 
‘three pillars’ (Runciman fieldnotes, 19 May 2018), NUPSAW, CWAO and the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF), of which many of the young workers are members of. The three pillars 
reflect the dynamic mix of strategies which workers are using to build associational power, a 
mix that does not rely on the traditional model of associational power, the trade union, alone.   
The union, NUPSAW, is viewed with a mixture of scepticism and hope. Workers wanted to 
join the union not only to build unity in their own workplace, but also with the high-street 
stores. But workers were also sceptical about the union and saw it as their role to push it rather 
than to rely on union officials.  
That union, without us it won’t even function. They are comfortable… this 
union is failing, it needs pushing – we are just pushing it… it’s not necessarily 
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the union doing the work, it’s us as workers… We are the ones frustrating the 
employer under the name of the union (Pule, group interview, 10 August 2018).  
After less than a year of union membership, the notion that the union was failing, largely 
because it had still yet to win workplace recognition, was a common sentiment expressed in 
worker meetings. Workers recognise that their associational power is derived from them as 
workers and not the union. CWAO and SWF continue to play an important role in providing 
workers with information on their rights and to support their organisation, even though they 
are union members. 
While the union continues to fight for recognition, CWAO continues to take up many of the 
shopfloor issues that workers encounter including the fight for equalisation, which the union 
has largely ignored. Employing both the union and CWAO is a deliberate strategy by workers 
to overwhelm management, as Tebogo explains,  
As NUPSAW, we tabled our demands, whereby one of the demands is a living 
wage of R12,500. And we want better working conditions... The other thing is 
that with CWAO, we are challenging this settlement agreement. So now the 
boss is focussing on NUPSWA… So as soon as the 20th, we sit with the union, 
he (management) will think ‘my problem are solved I promised the union 
members that I’ll give them R1, 000’. And then during the course of that week, 
he will receive an email saying ‘hey, we want you again’. So his problems will 
grow day by day (group interview, 10 August 2018).  
However, through the experience of a strike with NUPSAW in January 2018, workers also 
recognise the limits of what can be achieved through conventional means. When workers were 
dismissed for misconduct during a strike in 2018, the workers turned to their ‘secret weapon’, 
the EFF.  
When things fall apart and Simunye can’t do anything and the union can’t do 
anything, our last option is EFF… There are other things that the EFF can do to 
speed up the process. They will revoke the union’s license if they go illegally to 
the store to march. So EFF can do that… The only weapon we have is EFF. We 
use it when we run out of questions or options (Pule, group interview, 10 August 
2018).  
Following the dismissal, the EFF held two demonstrations occupying the outside of two stores 
near to the distribution centre, in Carlswald and the Mall of Africa (Midrand Reporter 2018). 
While EFF members were singing and toyi-toying outside the Mall of Africa store, Dis-Chem 
management phoned the EFF requesting that they come and meet with them. The EFF and the 
workers then negotiated for the reinstatement of the dismissed workers. 
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The reinstatement has had a powerful effect on the balance of workplace power and relations. 
In the absence of workplace recognition for the union, worker leaders have had to assist fellow 
workers in disciplinary hearings, with worker leaders boasting that they have never lost one. 
This has had a significant impact on the day-to-day power relations. Before workers were made 
permanent, Dis-Chem was described by Tebogo as a ‘yes boss’ situations, where they say you 
jump, you don’t ask how high, you just jump’ (group interview, 10 August 2018). Now, as Pule 
reflects, ‘he [the supervisor] avoids giving warnings because he knows we will retaliate… We 
understand that we have power’ (group interview, 10 August 2018).   
Conclusion  
The focus of this article has been to consider how, in the context of a weakened trade union 
movement, workers organise to fight against the inequalities they experience at work. The two 
case studies provide a situated and relational analysis of how different sources of power have 
unfolded in the struggle for labour broker workers to become permanent workers. Both cases 
provide insight into the state of contemporary workplaces in South Africa, where the workplace 
is divided and fragmented socially and, often, structurally. Labour broker workers are 
frequently not, as is often assumed, itinerant workers who transition through different 
workplaces frequently. In both cases, labour broker workers had worked for years at the same 
workplace. This highlights that these are not the flexible extras employers portray them to be, 
but that they occupy core functions of the production process. Labour broker workers are 
marginalised through lower wages, and their marginalisation is reinforced both by management 
and other permanent workers through excluding them either formally or informally from 
canteens and other facilities. These dynamics of exclusion over status and working conditions 
divide the workers and make mobilising and organising difficult. Our cases show how these 
phenomena unfold in relatively different workplaces, and thus point to deeper trends in the 
reshaping of workplace dynamics. 
This situation is either not challenged, ineffectively challenged or, at times, actively enforced 
by unions as the Luxor Paints case study illustrates, as well as similar case studies at Heineken 
and the South African Post Office (see Dickinson 2017a, 2017b; Englert 2018). While unions 
may often begin to recruit labour broker workers, they ultimately privilege the demands of 
permanent workers, fail to properly incorporate them into the union and even compromise the 
interests of labour broker workers.  
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It is against this context that the institutional power granted by the amendment to Section 198 
provided a powerful resource through which to challenge the workplace inequality caused by 
labour broking. The case studies presented here provide a reflection on the possibilities and 
limitations of institutional power. Indeed, on the one hand, it is the dependence on a routine 
use of the legal framework that seems to discourage the traditional unions’ attempts to ‘service’ 
those workers. NUMSA’s failed attempt at Luxor illustrates how managing an unusual case 
pushed the union to try and settle for less. This illustrates how the ‘double edged sword’ of 
institutional power can in certain contexts push worker organisations into positions where they 
guarantee stable and predictable industrial relations to the benefit of employers (Gallas 2016).  
However, in both cases, workers were able to wield the other edge of the sword. Indeed, in 
both cases the institutional power provided by the amendment to Section 198 provided the 
impetus for workers to start to organise. The institutional power provided by the amendment 
to Section 198 opened the door to building or consolidating workplace organisation. In this 
perspective, the two case studies show that associational power should not be understood solely 
as formalised organisations. Indeed, the flexible form of the Luxor workers’ forum or the loose 
network of successive collectives launching cases at Dis-Chem show that associational power 
takes on various forms.  
The trajectories of the struggles at both workplaces highlight the dynamic mix of power 
resources at play. The strength of organising from below is recognised both by the Dis-Chem 
and the Luxor workers. At Luxor, the workers retained their independent forum and co-existed 
with the union. At Dis-Chem, joining a union was seen as the best way to build unity in a 
divided and fragmented workplace. But at Dis-Chem, workers also use their newly forged 
associational power to keep pressure on the union and recognise that the strength of any worker 
organisation lies in the hands of workers themselves. Gaining knowledge of worker rights was 
crucial for building workers confidence and associational power. In addition, Dis-Chem 
workers were able to utilise a mix of associational and societal power against their employer, 
who had a consumer brand to worry about — a strategy that would prove less effective against 
a small paint manufacturer in a subsequent strike at Luxor Paints (see Hlungwani and 
Runciman 2019). 
Finally, the two cases highlight how labour struggles are being initiated by precarious workers 
themselves. It shows how workers’ organisation from below allows them to oppose changing 
mixes of power resources to the inequalities and injustices of the workplace. In addition, both 
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cases highlight the relational nature of power resources. This should warrant against a tendency 
in the literature to use the PRA as a checklist rather than as an analytical tool to understand 
how workers’ power is built in specific contexts. In addition, we show that associational power 
should be understood as a continuum between a loose informal network and formally structured 
organisational forms, rather than the excessive focus on the latter of most of the existing PRA 
literature. Finally, our two case studies show that the mainstream assumption that precarious 
workers should be organised by permanents and their unions might not always be true. In fact, 
in both cases, it is the precarious workers’ dynamism and struggle that initiate action in the 
workplace rather than the opposite. This questions some of the assumptions that are made about 
the direction from which potentials for union renewal may come. 
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